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Abstract: This paper examines the origins of the global crisis, the impact of the crisis and 
the different capsules taken to address the crisis. Using daily data from mid-July 2002 to 
mid-July 2012 for five groups of economies, our estimation is based on BEKK diagonal 
GARCH. We augmented two dummy variables to represent the U.S. financial crisis and the 
debt crisis of Greece. We find that the U.S. crisis has insignificant impact on the mean 
returns of all the economies except the African economies. The U.S. financial crisis, 
however, has positive and significant impact on the stock volatilities of all the groups except 
the African economies. The debt crisis of Greece, on the other hand, has negative and 
significant impact on the mean returns of the European and Latin American economies. Its 
impact on the stock volatilities, however, is positive and significant in all the economies 
except the African economies. In examining the origins of the crisis, we identify that 
excessive reliance of the U.S. economy on the credit system and on the stock market 
together with historic negligence of the production sector and inadequate regulation are 
some causative factors.  
Keywords: global finanicial crisis, subprime mortgage, stock market return and stock 
volatility. 
JEL Codes: E31 F32 G15 
1. Introduction 
The U. S. Economy in general and the U.S capital market in particular have become more 
global in the second half of the twentieth century. As a result, whatever affects the U.S 
economy affects the rest of the world.  For instance, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
dropped by 504 points in 2008, its largest drop since September 17, 2001 (Chossudovsky, 
2008), the European and Asian stock markets cracked immediately reporting a sharp plunge 
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in their stock indices.  The overall global financial firms’ loss soared to 1.8 trillion pounds 
(2.8 trillion U.S. dollar) (Shah, 2008). The financial loss gradually led to economic crisis 
which was revealed in the form of high unemployment rates and low growth around the 
world. Moreover, the crisis set chains of events which progressively led Europe into deepest  
recession and adversely affected the public finance and economic condition of Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain.  According to the IMF world economic outlook, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio rose to 160 percent, 105 percent, 120 percent and 84 percent in these countries 
respectively. The rate of unemployment also jumped into 17.3 percent, 14.3 percent, 8.3 
percent, and 21.6 percent in those countries in 2011.  
A report by the European Economy (2009) shows that the current global crisis has similar 
initial conditions and geographical origins as the crises in 1907-08 and 1929-35. All these 
crises originated in the U.S. and they all occurred after the rise in asset prices, the growth of 
money and credit, high confidence of the investors and the economic boom. However, the 
underlying causes of theses crises vary significantly. Although there are several factors that 
contributed to the recent crisis, the crisis has strong ties with the subprime mortgage crisis 
which damaged the U.S banking industry and later spilled its effect over to the U.S 
economy and to the rest of the world.  Dependence of the economy on loans, inadequate 
regulation of the banking industry, excessive consumption financed by loans, the war in the 
Middle East and the injection of excessive money into the economy that lowered the interest 
rate are some of the contributory factors to the crisis. The crisis intensified due to a historic 
record of low level of saving, speculation, fear and a lack of adequate banking and business 
confidence. To tackle the global crisis, different countries have taken different measures. 
Since the depth of the crisis is large, however, the effectiveness of the capsules will take 
time to reveal their actions.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the 
global economic and financial crises. Data collection and methodology are presented in 
section 2.2.1. The empirical results are discussed in section 2.2.2 followed by the discussion 
of identifying the roots of the turmoil. Section 4 presents the capsules used to allivaite the 
crisis. Conclusion is reported in section 5.  
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2. The Global Economic and Financial crisis 
The initial stages of the global crisis began to emerge in late 2006. The crisis then developed 
into a serious credit crunch with major downturns in the stock market in August 2007, as 
Langley (2008) indicates.  The crisis became severe when the big financial corporations 
such as AIG, Merrill Lynch, Lehman, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac declared bankruptcy in 
September 2008. The collapse of these financial institutions spread out to the global stock 
markets within seconds which ultimately sent damaging signals to the global economy. In 
this paper, we first present the economic crisis and then discuss the financial aspect of the 
crisis. 
2.1. Economic crisis 
It is evident from Table 1 that the economic growth across all the economies falls 
dramatically right after the crisis. The decline in growth, however, is marked more in 
advanced economies and in the European Union than in the remaining economies.This 
indirectly indicates that the European Union and advanced economies have stronger 
economic and financial ties with the U.S. than the rest. This could partly be the reason for 
the Euro zone crisis although there might be some other factors that possibly explain the 
causes.   
With the exception of emerging and developing economies as well as Sub-Saharan African 
countries, all the economies reported negative growth in 2009. The table indicates that the 
decline in GDP growth is sharper in the European Union than in other economies. All the 
economies somewhat recovered from their down turns in 2010 with the great break through 
in Latin American and Caribbean economies. The recovery, however, was followed by a 
plunge in the growth of GDP in 2011 which could be primarily due to the Euro zone crisis. 
The severity of the fall in the growth is less in Sub-Saharan African and  emerging and 
developing economies, at 4 percent and 13 percent respectively. The decline in growth in 
advanced economies and in Latin American countries, on the other hand, is 47 percent and 
25 percent. This again indicates the low level of interaction of the Sub-Saharan and 
emerging and developing economies with the European economies. In contrast, the large 
percentage fall in the growth of advanced economies and Latin American and Caribbean 
economies suggests a high level of integration of these economies with the European 
economies.  
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 Another aspect of the crisis is its impact on the current account balance of these economies, 
which is reported in Table 2.  The table shows that emerging and developing economies 
have managed to maintain surplus current account balance despite the U.S. and the Euro 
zone crises. Although the level of surplus declined after the U.S. crisis by 10 percent, it 
increased in 2010 and continued to rise in 2011 by 21 percent despite the Euro zone crisis.  
In contrast, the advanced economies, the European Union, the Latin America and the 
Caribbean economies have shown deficit balances through out the crisis.  
The current account balance of advanced economies was affected largely by the U.S. crisis 
which accounts for 36 percent than by the Euro zone crisis which shows a fall by 33 percent. 
Relative to the rest of the economies, the U.S. crisis mainly affected the current account 
balance of the European Union, with a decline of 86 percent.  The Sub-Saharan African 
economies maintained surplus current account balance right after the U.S. crisis but slided 
into deficit in 2009 and 2010 though they recovered in 2011.  
The impact of the U.S. crisis followed by the Euro zone crisis on the inflation rate is shown 
in Table 3.  All economies experienced a rise in the inflation rate right after the U.S. crisis. 
The inflation rate, however, subsided in 2009 and 2010 partly due to the different policy 
measures taken by different economies across the globe to ease the crisis. In 2011, the rate 
of inflation jumped again across all the economies with the highest rises in advanced 
economies, by 68 percent, followed by the European economies where the rate rose by 47 
percent.  
 
2.2. Financial crisis 
In this section, we conduct an empirical analysis on how the mean returns of the economies 
and their stock market volatilities have been affected as a result of U.S. and Greece crises. 
The following section, therefore, discusses the specific model employed in the analysis as 
well as the type of data used in the analysis. 
2.2.1. Data collection and methodology 
 To examine the impact of the U.S. financial crisis and the Euro zone crisis on the stock 
market performance of advanced and emerging economies, Europe, Pacific, Latin American, 
and selected African economies, daily data starting from mid-July 2002 to mid-July 2012 
are used. More specifically, the stock price indices of these groups of economies, 
      Mengesha, Duppati and Deo, Journal of International ande Global Economic Studies, 5(2), December 2012, 1-23  
 
 
5 
represented by MSACWF, MSEROP, MSPACF, FTSELAT and BOTDCII, are collected 
from the equity section of the DataStream.   
Two dummy variables representing the credit crunch of the U.S. and the debt crisis of 
Greece are employed. It has been noted that the first U.S. financial crisis started in August 
2007 (Langley, 2008). Based on this information, we applied one to all the days, month and 
years from 2007 onwards and zero for all the time periods before 2007. It has also been 
observed that the Greek government debt crisis began in late 2009 (Nelson et al., 2011). We, 
therefore, assigned the ones after the crisis and the zeros before the crisis in constructing the 
second dummy variable. The growth rate and the current account balance data of all the 
economies are collected from the IMF World Economic Outlook.  
The most commonly used measurement of volatility is the Autoregressive Conditionally 
Heteroscedastic method (ARCH family) and a standard deviation method.
1
 The ARCH 
family method provides conditional volatility while the standard deviation method measures 
unconditional volatility. A study on the exchange rate volatility in eight Asian countries by 
Rana (1981) shows that measuring volatility using standard deviation is inconsistent and 
misleading if the distribution is non normal. This resulted from the non normality of the 
distribution of the exchange rate in his studies in which the second moment is infinite and 
the standard deviation is unstable. For this study, ARCH family method has been selected 
over standard deviation method as the distributions of the stock market returns have shown 
platykurtic, positive excess kurtosis. 
From the ARCH family, Generalized Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroscedastic 
(GARCH) model is chosen. More specifically, a multivariate GARCH model is employed as 
it captures the effects of the interaction of the variables. From multivariate GARCH, 
diagonal BEKK is selected over diagonal VECH as the former guarantees a positive semi 
definite of conditional variance-covariance matrix, according to the argument of Engle and 
Kroner (1993). The diagonal BEKK GARCH model can be specified as follows: 
 
 𝑙𝑛
𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡 −1
𝑝  = 𝛿0𝑖 + 𝛾𝑓𝑖𝐷𝑓 + 𝛾𝑑𝑖𝐷𝑑 +  𝛿𝑖𝑗 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 −1
𝑟 +
5
𝑗=1
𝑢𝑖𝑡  
𝐻𝑡 = 𝑊
′𝑊 + 𝐶𝑓𝐷𝑓 + 𝐶𝑑𝐷𝑑 + AA tt 11   + BHB t 1  
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In the conditional mean equation s
p
iit  and s
p
iit-1  
 
 represent the stock price indices of the 
economies at time t and t-1 respectively.  i=1,....,5 stands for advanced and emerging 
economies, selected African economies, Europe, Latin American and Pacific economies 
respectively. The coefficient δ0i  is the constant term of the i
th 
economy. γfi  and γdi   are the 
coefficients of the dummy variables employed to represent the U.S. financial and Greece 
government debt crises respectively. The parameter δij  captures the past conditional mean 
return of the stocks of own economy represented by i and the past conditional mean return 
of the stocks of the other economies represented by j which runs from 1,...., 5.  
 In the conditional variance and covariance equation, Ht  is the conditional variance and 
covariance matrix at time t and includes: 
𝐻𝑡 =
 
 
 
ℎ11𝑡 ℎ12𝑡 ℎ13𝑡
ℎ21𝑡 ℎ22𝑡 ℎ23𝑡
ℎ31𝑡 ℎ32𝑡 ℎ33𝑡
     
ℎ14𝑡 ℎ15𝑡
ℎ24𝑡 ℎ25𝑡
ℎ34𝑡 ℎ35𝑡
ℎ41𝑡 ℎ42𝑡 ℎ43𝑡
ℎ51𝑡 ℎ52𝑡 ℎ53𝑡
     
ℎ44𝑡 ℎ45𝑡
ℎ54𝑡 ℎ55𝑡 
 
 
 
The conditional variance of the stock returns of each country is represented by the 
parameters on the diagonal of the matrix, whereas the conditional covariances between the 
countries are represented by the parameters off the diagonal of the matrix.  WW  are N X N 
parameter matrices. The positive semi definiteness of the Ht comes as a result of the product 
of  WW   as pointed out by Silvennoinen and Ter¨asvirta (2007). Cf and Cd represent the 
parameters of the U.S. financial crisis and Greece debt crisis. A and B are diagonal matrices 
parameters of ARCH (1) and GARCH (1) respectively.  
2.2.2. The empirical results  
The results of the BEKK GARCH using the U.S. financial crisis as a dummy variable are 
presented first.  The results are shown in three different sections. The first section mainly 
reports the findings of the mean equation. The second section reveals the results of variance 
and covariance equation. The results of the dummy variables in the variance and covariance 
equation are depicted in section three. The results in Table 4 show that the stock market 
returns of the advanced and emerging economies are positively and significantly affected by 
its own lagged return and also by the lagged returns of the African economies. It is, however, 
negatively and significantly influenced by the lagged returns of the European and Pacific 
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economies. This indicates that an increase in the lagged returns of Europe’s stock market 
decreases the mean stock market returns of these economies.  
On the other hand, the lagged stock market returns of the advanced and emerging economies 
have positive and significant impact on the mean stock market returns of Europe and Latin 
American economies. The positive impact of the returns in the stock markets of advanced 
and emerging economies shows the co-movement of the European and Latin American 
stock markets along with the advanced and emerging economies.  Similarly, the lagged 
return of the Pacific stock market has negative and statistically significant impact on 
advanced and emerging economies, Europe and Latin America. 
The coefficients of the dummy variable that signify the U.S. financial crisis are negative for 
all groups of economies. This implies that the crisis has caused the decline of the mean 
returns of all the economies. However, apart for the African stock market, the t-ratios of the 
coefficients are small which shows that they are statistically insignificant. It can be seen 
from the results in Table 5 that all the constant terms are positive and statistically significant. 
All the results of ARCH and GARCH are positive and statistically significant. The sum total 
of the ARCH and GARCH, however, indicates that the conditional variances are highly 
persistent and also unstable 
The impact of the crises on the stock market volatilities are shown by the results of the 
variances on the diagonal section of Table 6. It is clear from the results that the U.S. 
financial crisis has positive and statistically significant impact on the stock market volatility 
of all the economies except the African economies. This means that volatilities of the stock 
market in these economies have increased as a result of the U.S. financial crisis.  
When the Greek debt crisis is included in the model, the results of the mean equation, the 
variance and covariance equation as well as the impact of the crisis on the volatilities are 
reported in Tables 7, 8 and 9 below.  The results in Table 7 suggest that there is a positive 
and statistically significant effect of own and African economies lagged returns on the mean 
returns of the advanced and emerging economies.There is, however, negative and significant 
effect of the European and Pacific economies’ lagged returns on the mean returns of the 
advanced and emerging economies.  
The mean returns of the African economies is hardly affected by the lagged returns of the 
remaining economies regardless of using the US or Greece crises in the analysis.  The mean 
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returns of the European Union and the Latin American economies are positively and 
significantly affected by the lagged return of the advanced and emerging economies.  It is 
evident from the results that the Greek crisis has negative impact on the mean returns of all 
the economies but it has significant impact only on the mean returns of the European Union 
and the Latin American economies.    
As in the case of the U.S. financial crisis results, the coefficients of the variance and 
covariance equation in Table 8 are positive and significant. Furthermore, the ARCH and 
GARCH results are positive and significant, the sum of which shows that there are 
persistent volatilities. The results of the impact of the Greece crisis on the volatilities are 
specifically shown in Table 9. The results of the dummy variable that stands for the Greece 
debt crisis show positive and statistically significant impact on the mean returns of all the 
economies except the African economies.  Like the impact of the U.S. financial crisis, the 
debt crisis of Greece has negative and statistically significant impact on the mean returns of 
the African stock market.   
 
3. Identifying the Roots of the Turmoil 
 Relaxed regulation in the lending practices of the banking industry that was liberal in 
providing subprime mortgage loans is the main driving force beneath the roots of the crisis. 
Prior to 1990 it was very hard for those people in the U.S. with bad credit history to get 
home loans if they were not qualified for conventional Federal Housing Administration 
loans. The subprime loans, however, were introduced to provide loans for those who were 
less credit worthy (Subprime loans, n.d.). The idea of subprime mortgage, that is providing 
subprime loans securitised by Wall Street, was invented by an investment banker, William 
Komperda.  The idea became a funding bonanza in 1990 when Wall Street adopted and 
promoted this new investment security (Parsons, 2007).  
With the healthy economic foundation of the U.S., the subprime loans were very profitable 
in the 1990s.  As a result, subprime mortgage loans grew from 20 billion during 1993 to 150 
billion in 1998 and to 507.9 billion in 2005 as per the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development report. The number of subprime lenders also grew from 5 percent in 
1994 to 20 percent in 2005 (Zywicki, 2007 & Getter et. al., 2007). This poses a question as 
to how the profitability of the subprime loans eventually led the economy into crisis. The 
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crisis was built gradually in the process of different economic and financial interactions and 
the policy responses to the changes in the economy. On average, the Federal Funds Rate 
(FFR) of the 1990s was high relative to the FFR of the 2000s. It can be seen from Figure 1 
that in addition to high FFR, the unemployment rate starting from 1992 was low during the 
1990s.  
Despite the risk related to the subprime mortgage loans, the fall in unemployment rate 
provided lenders an assurance that borrowers were able to service their debt with less 
probability of defaults. Besides the high FFR and low unemployment rate, Figure 2 shows 
that the U.S. economic performance measured by GDP growth rate was reasonably well 
during the 1990s apart from 1991. The economic boost of the 1990s strengthened the 
confidence of lenders and their trust in the profitability of the market.  
There was a significant decline in growth during 2000, as is shown in Figure 2, which 
triggered the decrease in the FFR and tax rate in early 2001. The tax cuts, however, 
favoured the wealthiest investors with the expectation that they would re-invest and that 
there would be a trickledown effect in the economy. However, the capital earned from the 
tax cuts was invested in the stock markets in search of a higher rate of returns instead of in 
the production sector. This enhanced massive capital flight to the financial sector.  
While the stock market and the housing industry were in reasonably stable condition, the 
U.S. economic system was disrupted by the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 
September 2001. This external shock is believed to be the fundamental origin of all the 
crisis.  The attack damaged the U.S. stock market and thereby wiped out the capital flight to 
Wall Street by the wealthiest investors.  The GDP growth rate in the third quarter of 2001, 
as is shown in Figure 2, dropped to 1.41 percent, the lowest since 1992. Unemployment rate, 
as can be seen on Figure 1, also soared to 4.47 percent from 4 percent in the previous year. 
This triggered further tax cuts to the wealthiest investors and a FFR cut to stimulate the 
economy. The cycle repeated itself with massive investment on Wall Street due to the tax 
cuts to the wealthiest. Furthermore, the attack triggered the war in Afghanistan and the war 
in Iraq which drained the U.S. budget and paved the way to external debt growth, as 
expenditure on war is unprofitable and has no capital return or gain. 
Looking back to Figure 1, the unemployment rate kept growing since 2001 and gained its 
momentum in 2003 when it reached 6 percent. This had an impact on borrowers’ ability to 
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service debt which enhanced the growth of defaults.   Moreover, going to war in Iraq had a 
tremendous impact on oil prices which surged from 23 dollars to 36 dollars a barrel in the 
U.S. that undermined the U.S. economy (Frick, 2008). This then caused the fall in the FFR 
to 1.13 percent in 2003, the lowest rate since 1955 according to the FFR records from 1955 
to 2007. The decline in FFR drew more demand for loans and boosted the housing market. 
The housing market continued to grow from 1997 and ultimately gained its momentum in 
2005. This strengthened the confidence of the lenders in using the house property as 
collateral in cases when borrowers became delinquent. The growth of house prices, 
nonetheless, began to decline from the last quarter of 2005 and became negative in 2007, as 
is shown in Figure 3. The decline in the growth of the housing prices shattered the 
expectations of the lenders. Using houses as insurance against borrowers’ default became 
ineffective.    
With the fall in house prices, the FFR jumped from 1.13 percent to 3.22 percent in 2005 and 
continued to soar until it reached 5.02 percent in 2007. The rise in the FFR made it hard for 
subprime borrowers, who obtained adjustable-rate mortgages
2
, to make their monthly 
payments. As a result, the magnitude of borrowers’ default began to grow fast. With the fall 
in the housing prices and the growth of the defaults, lenders began to incur substantial 
amount of capital loss. Consequently, the wealth of U.S investors and investors around the 
world who had invested in the U.S. mortgage-backed securities have been wiped out. The 
existence of extreme financial liberty and global financial openness accelerated the spill-
over effect of the crisis.  The dominance of speculation in the stock market has also played a 
great role in spreading and worsening the crisis. The stock prices became more 
unpredictable as the stock market players swung more with every policy update declared in 
the media. 
4. The Capsules 
This study has shown how the U.S. crisis evolved and became global. Due to its global 
nature, different countries across the world have taken different policy measures in response 
to the crisis. Most of the instantaneous reactions of these countries, however, were limited to 
targeting the financial sector with the aim of restoring healthy credit flow in their economies. 
Although it was not wrong to target the financial sector, targeting other sectors of the 
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economy would have minimised the cost of restoration at the very beginning. An analogy of 
a patient with infectious wisdom teeth can help explain the advantages of policy responses 
aimed at targeting both the financial sector and other sectors. The patient with infected 
wisdom teeth does not only take painkillers and leave out anti-biotics to heal the infection. 
The patient has to take both at the same time and perhaps also take anaesthesia to extract the 
teeth. Likewise, the global eco-financial system has to take its different medications at the 
same time. Targeting the financial sector and thereby bailing out the banking industries may 
only have an anti-pain effect. Stimulating the economy, however, was needed 
simultaneously to have an anti-biotic effect which forbids the infection from widening and 
deepening its effect. Easing fear and repairing confidence in the economy might have an 
anaesthetic effect which then requires setting sound regulations in the banking system to 
have extraction effect of the toxic.  
Despite the seriousness of the global eco-financial crisis, politicians spent considerable 
amount of time trying to reach an agreement before even implementing the financial sector 
rescue plans. Just as putting the patient with serious infection on a waiting list jeopardises 
the patient’s health, so does the health of the global eco-financial system suffer while 
decisions are delayed. Minimizing the time lag would, therefore, have minimized the cost of 
recovery. 
Some of the policy responses taken by some countries are: the bailing out of the banking 
industry, deposit guarantee schemes, injecting stimulus packages, arranging reciprocal 
currency (swap lines) and lowering interest rates. Contrary to the policy response of most 
countries, some Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina inflated their 
interest rate after the U.S. financial crisis although they lowered by a insignificant amount 
later on. Lowering interest rates alone by some other countries, particularly by U.S., might 
not have a desired effect. There might be a massive capital flight to these Latin American 
countries. Considering the global representation of the U.S. financial institutions, it is likely 
that these financial institutions might get money at a cheaper borrowing cost from the U.S 
and invest in these countries in search of higher return. Ensuring consumers’ ability to 
service their debt is required in order to restore confidence and lessen fear and panic.  For 
this reason, creating more jobs and stimulating the economy via appropriate labour market 
policy and tax cuts, as Classicals and Keynesians would agree, would be more effective. 
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In lowering tax, however, permanent fiscal change is required. It is not only due to the 
permanent-income theory of Milton Friedman and the life-cycle theory of Franco 
Modigliani, that short term tax cuts will not lead to significant increase in consumer 
spending but also due to the historic record of massive consumer debt that needed to be 
financed. Lowering tax might enhance consumer spending. In contrast to this, as reported by 
Shedlock (2008), the famous financial forecaster and economist Peter Schiff suggestes 
lowering consumer spending and enhancing saving and investment. However, it should be 
noted that spending less in the midst of an economic downturn might be less effective while 
expecting more production at the same time. 
5. Conclusion 
In the past four years, the international economy has been affected by a succession of crises, 
the most influential being the U.S. crisis. The U.S. financial crisis, that began its early 
symptoms in late 2006 and burst its effect in 2008, spread globally with serious economic 
and financial consequences that hit the world in general and Europe in particular. The 
intensity of the crisis was manifested by low economic growth, high current account deficits 
and unstable financial systems across the globe which ultimately severely weakened the 
economy of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Italy. In addition, the crisis had severe implications 
for the financial contagion related to the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone, significant 
exchange rate fluctuations leading to rising oil prices and shifted competitive positions of 
some major traders, such as Brazil, and increased  geopolitical risks.  
This paper carefully examines the fundamental origins of the crisis within the context of U.S. 
economic and financial historic performance. The analysis shows that the subprime 
mortgage crisis alone is not the only causative factor of the financial crisis.  The monetary 
and fiscal policies adopted by the U.S. that generally favoured the wealthiest have also 
played vital roles in leading the U.S. economy into erratic condition and chains of economic 
fragility which made the financial sector vulnerable to defaults. 
Moreover, this paper empirically examines the effects of U.S. and Greece crises on the 
global stock market. Relative comparisons of the impact of the U.S. and Greece crises on 
the volatilities and mean returns of the stock markets indicate that, with the exception of the 
African economies, both crises have positive and significant effect on the volatility of all the 
economies. On the other hand, while the U.S. crisis has insignificant impact on the mean 
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return of the stock market of all the economies, except the African economy, the Greek 
crisis has negative and significant effect on the mean return of the stock market of European 
and Latin American economies. The increase in volatility as a result of the U.S. and Greece 
crisis indicates the extent of uncertainity in the stock markets which influence the decision 
of investors. Moreover, it shows how close the markets are to the U.S. and Greece stock 
markets.  
Despite the adoption of different policies in response to the crises, the global economic and 
financial system recovery has been slow and quite disquieting since the financial crises. The 
further slowing of trade expected in 2012 shows that the downside risks remain high. 
Likewise, the present trade forecast assumes global output growth of 2.1percent in 2012 at 
market exchange rates, down from 2.4 percent in 2011, based on a consensus of economic 
forecasters, which indicates severe downside risks for growth and negative consequences for 
trade. The global representation of the U.S. currency together with  the global representation 
of the U.S. financial market hinder any quick fix solution to the problem even if the affected 
countries take radical measures.   There is, therefore, a need to revisit the current global 
monetary system and systematically drift into a new system which will contribute to the 
restoration of the global economic and financial status.   
Endnotes 
*Corresponding author: Lula G. Mengesha, Department of Economics, University of 
Waikato, Private Bag 3015, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand. E-mail: luliyey@gmail.com 
We are greatful to the earlier comments given by Professor Mark J. Holmes, Gail E. 
Pittaway and Andrea Frances before the modification of the paper.  
1. See Akcay et.al., (1997), Brodsky (1984), Dell Ariccia (1999) and Kenen and Rodrick 
(1986). 
2. An adjustable-rate mortgage is a rate obtained below market rate for some period and 
then followed by higher market interest rates for the rest of the mortgage's term ((Myers, 
2008). 
      Mengesha, Duppati and Deo, Journal of International ande Global Economic Studies, 5(2), December 2012, 1-23  
 
 
14 
References 
 
Akçay, O. C., Alper, C. E., & Karasulu, M. (1997). Currency substitution and exchange rate 
instability: The Turkish case. European Economic Review, 41(3-5), 827-835. 
 
Brodsky, D. A. (1984). Fixed versus flexible exchange rates and the measurement of 
exchange rate instability. Journal of International Economics, 16(3-4), 295-306. 
 
Silvennoinen,  A.,  & Ter¨asvirta, T. (2007). Multivariate GARCH models, Handbook of 
Financial Time Series, New York: Springer. Retrieved from  
 
Basu, D. (2008). Global Financial Crisis and its Solution. Retrieved from  
http://www.blogs.ivarta.com/Global-Financial-Crisis-its-Solution/blog-218.htm 
 
Chossudovsky, M. (2008). Global financial meltdown. Global research centre for 
globalization Retrived from  
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10268 
 
Getter, D., E., Mark, J., Marc, L., & Edward, V., M. (2007). Financial crisis? The =liquidity 
crunch of August. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (September 21), p. 4.  
 
Dell', A., G., (1999,). Exchange rate fluctuations and trade flows: Evidence from the 
European Union. IMF Staff Papers, 46(3), pp. 315 -334. 
Engle, R.F. & Kroner, K.F. (1993). Multivariate simultanouse generalized ARCH, 
(Discussion paper no. 89-57R). San Diego: Department of Economics, University of 
California. 
 
Kenen, P. B., & Rodrik, D. (1986). Measuring and analysing the effects of short-term 
volatility in real exchange rates. Review of Economics and Statistics, 68(2), 311-315. 
 
      Mengesha, Duppati and Deo, Journal of International ande Global Economic Studies, 5(2), December 2012, 1-23  
 
 
15 
Frick, A. (2008, March 2). Iraq redeployment would cause oil prices to skyrocket to $200 a 
barrel. Think Progres.  Retrived from http://thinkprogress.org/2008/03/02/rove-oil-iraq/  
 
Langley, P.(2008). Sub-prime mortgage lending: a cultural economy. Economy and 
Society,37(4),  pp. 469-494   
 
Nelson, R. M., Belkin, P., & Mix, Derek, E. (2011). Greece’s Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy 
Responses, and Implications.Congressional Research Service. Retrived from 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41167.pdf 
Subprime loans. (n.d.).  Mortgage Lead Place. Retrieved from 
http://www.mortgageleadplace.com/subprime-loans.html 
 
Myers Rayth T. (2008). Foreclosing on the subprime loan crisis: Why current regulations 
are flawed and what is needed to stop another crisis from occurring. Oregon Law Review, 
87(311), 311-351. Retrieved from 
http://www.law.uoregon.edu/org/olr/archives/87/myers.pdf  
 
Parsons, J. (2007). So how did this “sub-prime” mess start anyway? Real Estate Raves. 
Retrieved from http://realestateraves.com/blog/2007/12/31/so-how-did-this-sub-prime-
mess-start-anyway/  
 
Rana, P. B. (1981). Exchange rate risk under generalized floating: Eight Asian countries. 
Journal of International Economics, 11(4), 459-466. 
Shah, A. (2008). Global Financial Crisis 2008. Global Issues Retireved from 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/768/global-financial-crisis 
 
Shedlock, M. (2008, November 10). Peter Schiff and China’s economy hard landing. 
Market Oracle. Retrieved from 
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7223  
 
      Mengesha, Duppati and Deo, Journal of International ande Global Economic Studies, 5(2), December 2012, 1-23  
 
 
16 
The European Economy (2009). Economic crisis in Europe: Causes, consequences and 
responses. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf 
 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (n.d.). Unequal Burden: Income & 
Racial Disparities in Subprime Lending in America. Retrieved from 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/unequal_full.pdf 
 
Zywicki, T., J. (2007). The regulation of subprime lending. Retrieved from 
http://mason.gmu.edu/~tzywick2/Capitol%20Hill%20Campus%20Subprime%20July%2012
%2007.ppt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Mengesha, Duppati and Deo, Journal of International ande Global Economic Studies, 5(2), December 2012, 1-23  
 
 
17 
    Table 1. GDP Growth Rate across Different Economies  
 
Year 
 
 
Advanced 
economies 
 
European 
Union 
 
Emerging  & 
developing 
economies 
Latin America  
& the 
Caribbean 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
2000 4.162 3.962 5.896 4.003 3.568 
2001 1.436 2.162 3.72 0.448 4.92 
2002 1.723 1.376 4.678 0.341 7.219 
2003 1.931 1.493 6.243 2.074 4.873 
2004 3.11 2.593 7.482 6.008 7.064 
2005 2.662 2.162 7.278 4.649 6.183 
2006 3.064 3.604 8.239 5.619 6.445 
2007 2.755 3.302 8.871 5.778 7.103 
2008 0.092 0.669 6.03 4.28 5.585 
2009 -3.717 -4.209 2.795 -1.747 2.784 
2010 3.072 1.793 7.327 6.083 5.404 
2011 1.613 1.692 6.395 4.532 5.174 
    Source: data collected from the International Financial Statistics of International Monetary Fund. 
 
   Table  2. Current Account Balance in percentage of GDP 
 
Year Advanced 
economies 
European 
Union 
Emerging  & 
developing 
economies 
Latin America  
& the 
Caribbean 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
2000 -1.054 -1.015 1.457 -2.279 0.698 
2001 -0.871 -0.322 0.752 -2.605 -1.481 
2002 -0.813 0.157 1.191 -0.891 -3.661 
2003 -0.729 0.108 1.906 0.493 -2.793 
2004 -0.657 0.449 2.37 0.979 -1.355 
2005 -1.183 -0.133 3.757 1.358 -0.582 
2006 -1.238 -0.38 4.981 1.607 4.287 
2007 -0.858 -0.56 3.976 0.402 1.585 
2008 -1.167 -1.017 3.559 -0.711 0.106 
2009 -0.18 -0.086 1.589 -0.605 -2.313 
2010 -0.22 -0.144 1.961 -1.177 -1.166 
2011 -0.292 -0.182 2.367 -1.398 0.567 
     Source: data collected from the International Financial Statistics of International Monetary Fund. 
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Table 3. Inflation Rate across a Group of Economies 
Year Advanced 
economies 
European 
Union 
Emerging  & 
developing 
economies 
Latin America  
& the 
Caribbean 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
2000 2.266 3.121 8.554 8.375 14.981 
2001 2.165 3.001 7.8 6.494 13.874 
2002 1.552 2.511 6.815 8.537 11.039 
2003 1.851 2.199 6.648 10.375 10.84 
2004 2.033 2.34 5.94 6.623 7.571 
2005 2.325 2.294 5.828 6.272 8.89 
2006 2.359 2.322 5.569 5.265 6.912 
2007 2.163 2.379 6.459 5.413 6.883 
2008 3.399 3.679 9.228 7.916 11.712 
2009 0.145 0.941 5.205 5.971 10.57 
2010 1.554 2.021 6.08 5.987 7.46 
2011 2.613 2.977 7.468 6.733 8.432 
Source: data collected from the International Financial Statistics of International Monetary Fund.   
 
 
 
Table 4. The Mean Equation-U.S. Crisis 
  
RN_ACW 
 
RN_AFR 
 
RN_EU 
 
RN_LA 
 
RN_PACI 
δ0i -0.293259*** 
(-8.752253) 
-0.012630 
(-1.144819) 
-0.783557*** 
(-18.19211) 
-1.360430*** 
(-28.10336) 
-0.864095*** 
(-28.10655) 
δ1i 0.293736*** 
(8.765581) 
0.013322 
(1.208683) 
0.784227*** 
(18.20587) 
1.361721*** 
(28.13394) 
0.865*** 
(28.118) 
δ2i 0.053947* 
(1.776798) 
0.145693*** 
(5.634698) 
0.069708* 
(1.807058) 
0.065543 
(0.998784) 
0.017728 
(0.458227) 
δ3i -0.095437*** 
(-4.410957) 
-0.003496 
( -0.343445) 
-0.451717*** 
(-14.69897) 
-0.635032*** 
(-16.97261) 
-0.134202*** 
(-6.334704) 
δ4i 0.008824 
(0.948872) 
0.000260 
(0.043512) 
-0.007985 
(-0.696160) 
-0.033883  
(-1.322056) 
0.028815*** 
(3.943185) 
δ5i -0.067639*** 
(-4.681864) 
-0.006934  
(-1.104010) 
-0.099492*** 
(-5.251951) 
-0.247082*** 
(-7.914756) 
-0.277281*** 
(-16.17795) 
γfi 
 
-0.000320  
(-0.930308) 
-0.000743*** 
(-4.071298) 
-0.000819  
(-1.684072) 
-0.000963 
 (-1.187539) 
-0.000502  
(-1.272394) 
Note: The results in parenthesis are the t-ratios. *** stands for statistically significant at all levels * represents statistically significant at 10 
percent. RN_ACW, RN_AFR, RN_EU, RN_LA and RN_PACI stand for the return on the stock market of Advanced and Emerging 
Economies, Selected African economies, European economies, Latin American Economies and Pacific economies. γfi = dummy 
variable representing the U.S. financial crisis.    
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Table 5. The Variance and Covariance Equation - U.S. Crisis 
  
RN_ACW 
 
RN_AFR 
 
RN_EU 
 
RN_LA 
 
RN_PACI 
w1i 0.000000713*** 
(8.377539) 
0.0000000405 
(0.314961) 
0.000000717*** 
(7.644927) 
 
0.00000325*** 
(7.748468) 
0.00000069*** 
(5.465497) 
w2i  0.00000325*** 
(28.03845) 
0.00000001 
(0.062753) 
-0.000000307  
(-0.820146) 
0.0000000182 
(0.089474) 
w3i   0.00000112*** 
(7.199175) 
0.0000039*** 
(7.065526) 
0.00000072*** 
(4.807719) 
w4i    0.0000252*** 
(8.487791) 
0.00000178*** 
(3.425872) 
w5i     0.00000304*** 
(6.220645) 
a1i 0.198458*** 
(33.65417) 
    
a2i  0.361913***  
(47.51238) 
   
a3i   0.176667*** 
(25.6393) 
  
a4i    0.335446*** 
(30.562) 
 
a5i     0.211905*** 
(23.27793) 
b1i 0.971812*** 
(621.8617) 
    
b2i  0.874452*** 
(254.7688) 
   
b3i   0.975973*** 
(605.2998) 
  
b4i    0.885472*** 
(90.05847) 
 
b5i     0.961354*** 
(263.0212) 
Note: The results in parenthesis are the t-ratios. *** stands for statistically significant at all levels. * represents statistically significant at 
10 percent.  
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Table 6. The Impact of the Crisis on the Volatilities - U.S. Crisis 
  
RN_ACW 
 
RN_AFR 
 
RN_EU 
 
RN_LA 
 
RN_PACI 
df1i 0.00000167*** 
(6.237404) 
-0.000000166  
(-0.731193) 
0.0000024***  
(7.131076) 
0.00000826*** 
(5.583725) 
0.000000875*** 
(3.42586) 
df2i  -0.000000399*** 
(-5.047367) 
-0.000000135  
(-0.44523) 
-0.0000000437  
(-0.055917) 
0.0000000118  
(0.043028) 
df3i   0.00000367*** 
(7.457398) 
0.0000124*** 
(5.997236) 
0.00000109*** 
(3.299857) 
df4i    0.0000407*** 
(8.274372) 
0.00000254** 
(2.113562) 
df5i     0.000000993*** 
(2.933564) 
Note: The results in parenthesis are the t-ratios. *** stands for statistically significant at all levels. **signify statistically significant at 5 
and 10 percent.  * represents statistically significant at 10 percent. df = the dummy variable representing the U.S. financial crisis in 
the variance and covariance equation. 
Table 7. The Mean Equation- Greece Crisis 
  
RN_ACW 
 
RN_AFR 
 
RN_EU 
 
RN_LA 
 
RN_PACI 
δ0i -0.296294*** 
(-8.947604) 
-0.012205  
(-1.056029) 
-0.783140*** 
(-18.73068) 
-1.394822*** 
(-29.96949) 
-0.864725*** 
(-28.52104) 
δ1i 0.296720*** 
(8.960523) 
0.012547 
(1.086918) 
0.783735*** 
(18.74609) 
1.396171*** 
(29.97059) 
0.864980 
(28.52527) 
δ2i 0.056334** 
(2.002675) 
0.155087*** 
(5.906340) 
0.074153** 
(2.014055) 
0.057551 
(0.891297) 
0.023087 
(0.584912) 
δ3i -0.095244*** 
(-4.532404) 
-0.005699  
(-0.556530) 
-0.451014*** 
(-15.19585) 
-0.651102*** 
(-17.00717) 
-0.132753*** 
(-6.501690) 
δ4i 0.008420 
(0.895160) 
0.001566 
(0.248076) 
-0.007504  
(-0.645019) 
-0.031992  
(-1.206338) 
0.026080*** 
(3.673530) 
δ5i -0.067939*** 
(-4.803744) 
-0.006594  
(-1.004912) 
-0.097141*** 
(-5.251236) 
-0.258265*** 
(-8.526530) 
-0.283210*** 
(-16.76699) 
γdi 
 
-0.000441  
(-1.060097) 
-0.0000598 
(-0.327865) 
-0.001071*  
(-1.759307) 
-0.002071** 
(-2.097845) 
-0.000337 
 (-0.774659) 
Note: The results in parenthesis are the t-ratios. *** stands for statistically significant at all levels. ** signify statistically significant at 5 
and 10 percent. * represents statistically significant at 10 percent. di= the dummy variable representing Greece crisis in the variance 
and covariance equation. 
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Table 8. The Variance and Covariance Equation - Greece Crisis 
  
RN_ACW 
 
RN_AFR 
 
RN_EU 
 
RN_LA 
 
RN_PACI 
w1i 0.000000722*** 
(8.084058) 
0.0000000297 
(0.248222) 
0.000000723*** 
(7.445849) 
 
0.00000296*** 
(7.847054) 
0.000000759*** 
(5.60492) 
w2i  0.00000353*** 
(31.43618) 
0.0000000474 
(0.293698) 
-0.000000445  
(-1.235709) 
0.0000000577 
(0.328203) 
w3i   0.00000111*** 
(6.823342) 
0.00000372*** 
(7.139324) 
0.000000762*** 
(4.844389) 
w4i    0.0000204*** 
(8.887334) 
0.00000143*** 
(3.108949) 
w5i     0.00000342*** 
(6.022961) 
a1i 0.205078*** 
(38.06536) 
    
a2i  0.365671***  
(48.81145) 
   
a3i   0.195359*** 
(32.18485) 
  
a4i    0.36476*** 
(33.55439) 
 
a5i     0.20088*** 
(24.31128) 
b1i 0.972699*** 
(673.5348) 
    
b2i  0.872785*** 
(254.55) 
   
b3i   0.975059*** 
(627.6242) 
  
b4i    0.905769*** 
(141.0785) 
 
b5i     0.964599*** 
(277.7606) 
Note: The results in parenthesis are the t-ratios. *** stands for statistically significant at all levels. **signify statistically significant at 5 
and 10 percent.  * represents statistically significant at 10 percent.  
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Table 9. The Impact of the Crisis on the Volatilities-Greece Crisis 
  
RN_ACW 
 
RN_AFR 
 
RN_EU 
 
RN_LA 
 
RN_PACI 
dd1i 0.0000012*** 
(4.24987) 
-0.000000297  
(-1.279001) 
0.00000189*** 
(4.738477) 
0.00000404*** 
(3.313189) 
0.000000677**  
(2.3466) 
dd2i  -0.00000138*** 
(-13.86759) 
-0.000000468  
(-1.460858) 
0.000000012  
(0.017014) 
-0.000000133  
(-0.486674) 
dd3i   0.00000302*** 
(4.879656) 
0.00000593*** 
(3.23004) 
0.00000102*** 
(2.513947) 
dd4i    0.000019*** 
(6.981191) 
0.00000214* 
(1.761238) 
dd5i     -0.000000241 
(-0.675348) 
Note: The results in parenthesis are the t-ratios. *** stands for statistically significant at all levels. ** signify statistically significant at 5 
and 10 percent. * represents statistically significant at 10 percent. dd= the dummy variable representing Greece crisis in the variance 
and covariance equation. 
 
               Figure 1. Unemployment Rate and Federal Funds Rate 1990-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Source: data collected from  http://www.bls.gov/cps/prev_yrs.htm and                              
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Annual/H15_FF_O.txt and then transformed in to figure using 
Microsoft Excel.   
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            Figure 2. U.S real GDP from 1990 - 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Source: data collected from  http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_Set_Group_Id=354 and then transformed in to figure using        
Microsoft Excel.   
              Figure 3. The growth of U.S. housing prices from 1990 to 2008 
 
                        Source: data collected from  http://www.ofheo.gov/newsroom.aspx?ID=487&q1=0&q2=0 and then transformed in to 
figure using Microsoft Excel 
 
